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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "DIVESTING THEORY"
IN THE REGULATION OF MILK
By FORREST REVERE BLACK*
The divesting theory, by means of which Congress divests
,certain articles of their interstate character, has become asso-
ciated in our popular thinking with the problem of liquor regu-
lation. The history of the Agricultural Adjustment Act and of
-state acts of a similar character demonstrates the need of a
utilization of this theory in the field of milk regulation. It
shall be our purpose to show (1) the present legal status of milk
regulation, federal and state; (2) how the divesting theory
functioned in the field of liquor regulation and (3) the poten-
tialities of this theory in the field of milk regulation.
1. THE PRESENT LEGAL STATUS OF MILK REGUL.ATION,
FEDERAL AND STAT E
The commerce clause has become the stumbling block in the
present regulation of milk, federal and state. A review of the
litigation of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration for
the year 1934 shows that the government sustained a serious
set-back in two types of milk cases: (A) The government lost
two out of three cases1 in the Federal District courts involving
the validity of the Chicago Milk License, although in these
cases it was shown that 40% of all milk consumed in the Chi-
cago area was produced outside the state of Illinois. In the
two decisions hostile to the government's contention, the court
-declared that the Chicago Milk License was an attempt by the
Federal Government to regulate the production of milk, and
that the production of milk is not interstate commerce. (B) The
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, on sabbatical leave
1934-35; Chief Attorney, Agricultural Adjustment Administration. A. B.,
-Wisconsin (1916); M. A., Columbia (1919); LL. B., Ohio State (1920);
Ph. D., Brookings Itistitute (1925). Author of "Ill Starred Prohibition
Cases" (1931), and of numerous law review articles.
I United States v. Shissler, et al., D. C. N. D. Ill., April; 1934 (Won);
,dgewater Dairy Co. v. Wallace, et al., D. C. N D. Ill., June, 26,
1934 (Lost); Cohumbas Milk Producers Cooperative Association, et al.
v. Wallace, D. C. N. D. Ill., Nov. 26, 1934 (Lost). Up to January 1,
1935, there has been'no decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals or
by the Supreme Court of the United States on the constitutionality of
any section of the A. A. A.
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government lost seven District Court decisions during 1934:
involving milk licenses wherein the dairies purchased and sold
all of their milk within the same state. In this latter type of
case, the government, although admitting that there was no
physical movement of fluid milk in interstate commerce to these
markets, sought to justify the validity of the federal regulation
of fluid milk upon the so-called "butter theory"; that dairy
products (butter, cheese, etc.) were and are being transported
in great quantities in interstate commerce throughout the coun-
try; that the price received by producers for their fluid milk
in these markets is so interrelated with the price of these prod-
ucts which move in interstate commerce and that the price of the
former substantially affects the price and movements of dairy
products in interstate commerce, 'and hence federal regulation
of the purchase of fluid milk from the producer for consumption
in these Sales Areas is legally justified. But the court refused
to accept the argument that these markets were in the "cur-
rent" of interstate commerce because of the high degree of cor-
relation that exists between the prices of fluid milk and other
dairy products.
It is somewhat difficult to distinguish this second type of
case from the holding in Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen3 in
which the Grain Futures Act was held valid. Purchases and
sales for future delivery are not only transactions intrastate in
form, but they involve no physical movement of the commodity
whatsoever. The court conceded that the curve of grain future
prices did not parallel the curve of cash grain prices, and
pointed out that the price of grain futures and the price of'
cash grain were not dependent upon the same factors. But the
court found that there was an occasional, although not a con-
stant relation between the two and held the act valid under the
commerce power on the theory that "Sales of an article which
affect the country-wide price of the article directly affect the
country-wide commerce in it".:
2 United States v. Neuendorf, et al., D. C. S. D. Iowa, Oct. 19, 19M;
lnited States v. G'reenwood Dairy Farms, Inc., D. C. S. D. Ind., Sept.
27, 1934; Hill v. Darger, D. C. S. D. Calif., Sept. "7, 1934; Kurtz v.
Berdie, D. C. S. D. Calif., Sept. 7, 1934; Douglas v. Wallace, D. C. W. D.
Okla., Oct. 17, 1934; Royal Farms Dairy v. Wallace, et al., D. C. D.
Md., Nov. 16, 1934; Meliwood Dairy, et al. v. Sparks, D. C. W. D. Ky.,
July 2, 1934.
3262 U. S. 1 (1922).
'At p. 40.
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It should be unnecessary to labor the point that under the
present legal set-up the federal government is having tough
sledding in regulating milk by way of license under the com-
merce.clause. The two factual situations discussed above ob-
viously include substantially every milk market. But this is
only one-half of the picture. To what extent is the commerce
clause a stumbling block to effective state regulation of milk?
An analysis of the case of Seelig v. Baldwin5 will indicate the
need of a new legal mechanism. It is our contention that the
mechanism will be found in an application of the divesting
theory.
In the Seelig case the court held unconstitutional Section
258 (m) (4) of Article 21(a) of the New York Agriculture and
Markets Law enacted in 1934 and the regulations thereunder,6
as a direct burden on interstate commerce. The state of New
York had created a system of price control over the sale of
milk, in pursuance of which it was provided that no milk shall
be sold within the state which is bought outside at prices less
than those fixed for the purchase of milk from farmers within
the state. The plaintiff, a New York milk dealer buys its milk
in Vermont and the milk is shipped in cans from Vermont to
the New York market. The defendant, Baldwin, is the Commis-
sioner of Agriculture and Markets and has" refused to issue a'
license to the plaintiff to sell in New York unless it agrees to
obey all orders of the Commissioner, including that just men-
tioned. The court said "Section-258(m) (4) does not forbid
the importation of milk into New York from outside; it merely
prevents its sale when it gets there, unless it has been bought
at the price which must be paid for similar milk in New York."
The court held "that the original cans . . . were bona fide un-
broken packages; they are still a part of interstate commerce
. . . Although the section in question may be a reasonable in-
cident to the state's internal economic policy, nevertheless it
seeks to protect a local industry by excluding foreign competing
goods, and that is exactly the kind of activity against which
the commerce clauses are primarily directed . . . No matter
'U. S. District Court S. D. of N. Y. before Learned Hand, Circuit
Judge and Bondy and Patterson, District Judges, decided August 2,
1934.
'There was also involved an identical section of the act of 1933:
Sec. 312(g) of Article 25.
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what the local need, as a nation we are without protective eco-
nomic barriers between the states, certainly unless Congress sees
fit to allow them".
2. How THE DIVESTING THEORY FUNCTIONED IN THE FEET OF
LIQUOR REGULATION
To understand the divesting theory, sometimes referred to
as the doctrine of Congressional permission, as exemplified by
the Wilson Act of 18907 and the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913,8 it
is necessary by way of background to refer to two early cases:
Brown v. Md. 9 and Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens.10 In
Brown v. Md., Chief Justice Marshall created the "Original
Package" doctrine which has been used as a convenient test for
determining the boundary between federal commerce power
and state police power.
In the case of Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens the court
out of whole cloth, created a doctrine dividing interstate com-
merce into two categories: the first, national in character and
requiring uniformity of regulation, over which the power of
the states is inoperative even in the absence of legislation by
Congress; and the second, local in character over which the
state may exercise authority until Congress acts. The Cooley
case gives no definite answer to the question as to the criterion
by which *the court determines whether the regulations are
national or local. The language of Mr. Justice Curtis contains
intimations which can be interpreted either way.
In the Cooley case, Congress had acted, but in later cases
the court was confronted with the problem of the inference to
be drawn from Congressional silence. In Welton v. Mo." the
court said, "Its (Congress's) inaction on this subject...
is equivalent to a declaration that the interstate commerce shall
be free and untrammeled". This doctrine has been followed
in many subsequent cases,12 and it is pregnant with the in-
.' 26 Stat. at L. 313.
'37 Stat. at L. 699, 700.
'12 Wheat. 419 (1827).
1012 How. 299 (1851).
"91 U. S. 275 (1875).
'Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489 (1887);
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 484 (1877); County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102
U. S. 691 (1881); Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678 (1882); Cov-
ington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204 (1894); Missouri v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298 (1924); West v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co., 221 U. S. 229 (1911).
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ference that the Supreme Court takes the "will" of Congress as
the criterion for determining the validity of state regulation. If
the court professes to be bound by the "will" of Congress im-
plied from its silence, it cannot -logically fail to follow that
same "will" when expressed by positive legislation.18  Chief
Justice Fuller in the case of In re Rahrer14 commenting on the
criterion to determine when a regulation was national in charac-
ter and when local said, "We recall no decision giving color to
the idea that when Congress acted, its action would be less
potent than when it kept silent".
The divesting theory came into its own during the latter
part of the 19th century to protect dry states from the iflux
of intoxicating liquor through the channels of interstate com-
merce. Iowa sought to prohibit carriers from bringing intox-
icating liquors into the state for consignees not duly author-
ized to receive the same. This legislation was declared invalid
in the case of Bowman v. Chicago Northwestern Railway 6o.1 5
Two years later the court in the case of Leisy v. Hardin'6 held
that the state of Iowa was powerless to seize shipments of in-
toxicating liquors from other states while still in the original
package.
The Leisy case is a landmdrk in the development of the
divesting theory because of a suggestion made in that case by
Chief Justice Fuller. He reasoned that the Iowa statute was
passed in the exercise of the police power but that it was in-
applicable because of the will of Congress implied from its
silence. In the course of his discussion he made this significant
suggestion: "Yet a subject-matter which has been confided ex-
clusively to Congress by the Constitution is not within the juris-
diction of the police power of the state, unless placed there by
Congressional action".'7 The prohibition forces did not delay
in acting on the suggestion of the court.
' See the admirable article by W. C. Scott, "State and Federal
Control of Power Transmission as Affected by the Interstate Com-
merce Clause," in 14 Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science
153 (May, 1930).
14140 U. S. 545 (1891).
- 125 U. S. 465 (1888).
"8135 U. S. 100 (1890).
"Ibid. note 16 at p. 108.
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In- 1890 Congress passed the Wilson Act,18 which had for
its object the abrogation of the rule announced in the Leisy
case. The effect of the statute was to permit the states under
the police power to regulate interstate shipments of liquor one
step earlier than they otherwise could under the doctrine of the-
Leisy case. However, the court in Rhodes v. Iowa'9 construed
the word "arrival" in the Wilson Act to mean arrival to the
consignee and not arrival in the sense that the goods had crossed
the state line. Because of this interpretation, the act was de-
prived of much of its practical effectiveness. The prohibition
forces were driven to seek more effective federal legislation and
in 1913 Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act.20
The Webb-Kenyon Act was upheld in the case of Clark
Distilling Co. v. Western Md. R. R. Co.,21 and this in the face,
of the fact that the act had been vetoed by President Taft on
constitutional grounds. 22  An analysis of this leading case will
indicate the nature of the divesting theory.
The court disposed of the contention (1) that the act dele-
gated power to the states in the following language:
"It is true the regulation which the Webb-Kenyon Act contained.
permits state prohibitions to apply to movement of liquor from one
state into another, but the will which causes the prohibitions to be ap-
plicable is that of Congress, since the application of state prohibitions
would cease the instant the act of Congress ceased to applyY"
826 Stat. at L. 313 (1890). The Wilson Act provided: "That all
fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported-
into any state or territory and remaining therein for use, consumption,
sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such state or territory,
be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such state or ferri-
tory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent
and in the same manner as though such liquors or liquids had been
produced in such state or territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom
by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or other-
wise."
1"170 U. S. 412 (1898).
2137 Stat. at L. 699, 700. The main provisions of this act were as
follows: "An Act divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate
character in certain cases . ..That the shipment or transpoitation,
in any manner or by any means whatsoever, of any spirituous, vinous,
malted, fermented, or other intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one
State, Territory, or District of the United States ... into any other
State, Territory, or District of the United States ...which said .. .
liquor is intended, by any person interested therein, to be received,
*possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original package
or otherwise, in violation of any law of such State, Territory, or Dis-
trict of the United States .. . is hereby prohibited."
2242 U. S. 311 (1917).
2 Veto message of the President, 49 Cong. Rec. 4291; Opinion ot
the Attorney General, 30 Ops. Atty. Gen. 88.
x Ibid. note 21 at p. 326.
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It has been suggested by Professor Thomas Reed Powell2 4 that.
the operation of such an act is no more a delegation of power-
than the acts of Congress which permit an administrative au-
thority to determine the conditions on which the law applies,
for in permissive legislation, Congress is only substituting state
legislatures for administrative bodies. And certainly the prac-
tice of permitting administrative agencies to determine the
condition on which a law applies is not unconstitutional as a
delegation of power.25
(2) Is the divesting doctrine in conflict with the doctrine-
that federal power over interstate commerce (in regulations of
a national character) is exclusive? If the federal power in this-
field is exclusive, Congress could not by any legislation author-
ize the state to exercise or share with it in the exercise of
strictly commerce power. The court reconciled these doctrines.
as follows: (a) In the Clark case it was pointed out that the
Webb-Kenyon law brought into play the "identical power" as-
was exercised in the Wilson Act. (b) In the case of In re,
Rahrer the court construed the Wilson Act and held that Con-
gress in exercising its commerce power may place interstate-
commerce in liquor where state laws can apply. No power is-
delegated; for the state in prohibiting the transportation of
liquor, is exercising a reserved power under the constitution,
namely, its police power.26 (3) With reference to the conten-.
tion that the Webb-Kenyon Act lacked uniformity the court
said:
"There is no question that the act uniformly applies to the con-
ditions which call its provision into play,-that its provisions apply to
all states,-so that the question really is a complaint as to the want
of uniform existence of things to which the act applies, and not to an
absence of uniformity in the act itself. But, aside from this it is obvious
that the argument seeks to engraft upon the Constitution a restric-.
tion not found in it; that is, that the power to regulate (commerce)
conferred upon Congress obtains subject to the requirement that regu--
lations enacted shall be uniform, throughout the United States. In view
of the conceded powers on the part of Congress to prohibit the move--
meat of intoxicants in interstate commerce, we cannot admit that be-
cause it did not exert its authority to the full limit, but simply regu--
24 "The Validity of State Legislation Under the Webb-Kenyon Act,"
2 Southern Law Quarterly 112, 125 (1917).
2Fiea v. Clark, 134 U. S. 649 (1891).
See Bikle, "The Silence of Congress," 41 H. L. R. 200, 219. See
also Foppiano v. ,Speed, 199 U. S. 501 (1905), wherein the same theory
was applied in the exercise by the state of another reserved power,
e. g., a license tax.
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lated to the extent of permitting the prohibitions in one state to pre-
vent the use of interstate commerce to ship liquor to another state,
-Congress exceeded its authority to regulate."' t
(4) After disposing of the delegation and the lack of uni-
formity contentions and having reconciled the divesting theory
-with the doctrine that federal power is exclusive in regulations
of a national character, the court proceeded to develop the basic
-affirmative doctrine to justify the validity of this legislation.
Relying on the Lottery Ca.Se 28 and Hoke v. United States29
which the court declared would justify the right of Congress
-to completely prohibit the shipment of all intoxicants in the
channels of interstate commerce, the court argued that
"We can see no escape from the conclusion that if we accepted
-the proposition urged, we would be obliged to announce the contradic-
tion in terms that because Congress had exerted a regulation lesser
in power than it was authorized to exert, therefore its action was void
for excess of power."'
Thus upon the principle that the whole must contain its parts,
the act should be sustained as a valid regulation of commerce.
And upon the principle of In re Rahrer3- it would operate to
place liquor within state jurisdiction as soon as it crossed the
border.
(5) Is the divesting theory limited in its application to in-
toxicating liquor? Mr. Chief Justice White, in the last sentence
of his decision indulged in the following obiter dictum:
"The exceptional nature of the subject here regulated is the basis
upon which the exceptional power exerted must rest, and affords no
.ground for any fear that such power may be constitutionally extended
to things which it may not, consistently with the guaranties of the
Constitution, embrace."n
This statement in addition to being dictum does not say un-
equivocally that the divesting theory is limited to the subject
:matter, liquor.
The famous case of Leisy v. Hardin33 not only contained
the suggestion which was responsible for the passage of the
0 Ibid. note 21 at p. 327-
2 Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1902e.
,227 U. S. 308 (1912).
"Ibid. note 21 at p. 331. See Corwin, "Congress's Power to Pro-
'hibit Commerce-A Crucial Constitutional Issue," 18 Cornell Law
-Quarterly 477.
"140 U. S. 545 (1891).
2Ibid. note 21 at p. 332.
"135 U. S. 100 (1890),
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Wilson Act but also indicated clearly that articles (other thair
liquor) may be brought under the divesting theory. The court
in that case said:
"The responsibility is upon Congress, so far as the regulation of'
interstate commerce is concerned, to remove the restriction upon the,
state In dealing with imported articles of trade within its limits which
have not been mingled with the common mass of property therein,
if In its judgment the end to be secured justifies and requires such.
action."
Whether an article is of a nature to demand a divesting of its:
interstate character is a question for Congressional discretion.
The exceptional nature of the article goes to the question of
policy-not of power. There is nothing in the decision of the-
Clark case (under a proper doctrine of stare decisis) contrary
to this conclusion.34 Further the history of federal legislation-
shows that the theory of Congressional permission has been ap--
plied to many articles other than liquor.3 5
(1) Quarantine and health laws passed by Congress in 1790..
(1 Stat. at L. 174, 619.) These acts were upheld obiter in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).(2) Congressional act of 1802 prohibiting the Importation of
slaves in the states having laws against slavery. This .was held con-
stitutional in the Brig Wilson, 1 Brockenborough 423, 437 (1820).(3) Revised statutes, Sec. 4280, dealing with the importation of
nitroglycerine. The validity of this Congressional "permission" has
never been questioned.
(4) Congressional act of 1902 divesting oleomargarine and.
similar substances of their Interstate character. (32 Stat. at L. 193.)
Its validity was upheld in the case of U. S. v. Green, 137 Fed. 179
(1905).
(5) The Lacey Act which Prohibits any person from delivering7
for shipment or any common carrier from shipping game killed in
violation of state laws. (35 Stat. at L. 1137, 1909.) The law was upheld
in Rupert v. U. S., 181 Fed. 87 (1910).
(6) Another example of Congressional permission Is the Plant.
and Quarantine Act (44 Stat. at L. 250, 1926). This statute has not.
been passed upon by the states.
(7) The Hawes-Cooper Act provides for the divestment of their
interstate character of convict-made goods, so as to permit the states.
to prohibit their sale. '(45 Stat. at L. 1084, 1929.) The court has not
passed on this legislation.
(6) Congressin divesting an article of its interstate charac-
ter does not tliereby, automatically divest itself of the power-
to control the interstate shipment of such article. The Webb-
Kenyon Act was amended in 1917 so as to make a violation of
"See Dowling and Hubbard, "The Divesting Theory," in 5 Minn.
L. R. 100, 253.16We are indebted to William Campbell Scott for a list of federal
divesting statutes dealing with subjects other than liquor. (See supra,.
note 13.)
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the act a federal crime.36 This amendment was sustained in
jnited States v. Hill.3 7 In the Hill case the court said,
"Congress could . . . forbid a person to bring any intoxicating
liquor upon his person, intended for his personal consumption, into .
:state which forbids the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor for.
beverage purposes, although the state law expressly permits a person
-to bring that quantity of liquor into the state for his personal use."
It is important to note that although Congtess had divested in-
toxicating liquor of its interstate character, the court held that
Congress still has a plenary authority over interstate commerce
-either in aid of or without reference to the particular policy or
law of any given state. The court made this perfectly plain
when it said, "It (Congress) may exert its authority, as in the
'Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, having in view the laws of the
-state, but it has a power of its own, which in this instance it has
,exerted in accordance with its view of public policy."
This case would seem to remove the objection raised by
Dowling and Hubbard in their article, "Divesting an Article of
Its Interstate Character". 38 These writers said,
"A curious feature of this doctrine seems to have escaped both
Congress and the courts. The immediate objective was to sustain state
jurisdiction. May not the doctrine contain an unintended and dis-
turbing effect on federal jurisdiction? If it Is stripped of its interstate
'character, has it not also been stripped of its subjection to federal
'regulation? In other words in divesting an article of its interstate
'character, does not Congress also divest itself of the power to con-
trol the interstate shipment of such .articles?"
3. THE POTENTIALITIES OF THE DIVESTING THEoRY nr
MimK REGULATION
The foregoing discussion demonstrates (1) that a Con-
-gressional divesting statute would prevent-the repetition of an-
other Seelig v. Baldwin case,3 9 where milk was shipped from
Vermont in cans into the New York market. Such a statute
-vould make state police power effective to cope with this situa-
tion. (2) If the higher courts do not overrule the two Chicago
Milk License cases 40 wherein the district courts denied the
right of federal regulation, although it was admitted that 40%
"Reed Amendment, Oh. 162, 39 Stat. 1058, 1069, March 3, 1917.
248 U. S. 420 (1919).
N5 Minn. L. R. at 208.
See note 5, supra.
See note 1, swm .
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-of the milk was shipped into the Chicago market from other
.states, it will result that this kind of a market, under the pres-
ent legal set-up, cannot be regulated at all, by either federal or
state legislation. A federal divesting statute will permit the
-states to deal with this problem and they will escape the
Seelig v. Baldwin doctrine. The divesting theory also appears
to offer a greater chance for cooperation between the nation and
the states. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals has
said,
"The Central Government was not created to be an opponent and
.a rival of the state governments, but to be a supplement and a pro-
tection to them. Its numerated powers, although supreme and some-
times exercised to the dissatisfaction of some states, are not misused
-when by happy concord of duty these governments can cooperate ...
-such cooperation between state and Central Government Is not con-
stitutionally wrong, but right and desirable.""'
The proposed suggestion therefore transforms the commerce
,clause from a stumbling block into an effective instrumentality
for opening up a cooperative method *of dealing with the milk
problem.42
In another article, shall be discussed the problem as to whether
,Congress can impose ITS policy on the states under a divesting scheme
by (1) adopting a system of CONDITIONAL divesting, I. e., divesting
articles of their interstate character in those cases wherein the states
lhave accepted the federal standards of regulation and (2) by imposing
tederal duties on state officers.
0 Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. Ryan, et al., 71 Fed. (2d) 1, 8 (1934).
"2The seven District Court decisions (see footnote 2, supra) re-
pudiating the government's "butter theory" in those markets wherein
the dairies purchased and sold all of their milk within the same state,
-would seem to Invite state regulation, even in the absence of divesting
legislation.
